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Abstract
This chapter provides an overview of the issues and challenges facing policy
makers intending to establish groundwater markets. It studies in detail two
developed countries that have introduced groundwater trading and have some
experience in its implementation—Australia and the United States of America—
and draws out lessons from these countries that need to be considered for the
development of groundwater markets around the world. The key lessons that this
chapter stresses are: the importance of establishing institutions and regulations;
investing in high quality economic and scientific research; that opportunities
arise from crises; and that social concerns are not always the most important
considerations to be aware of for efficient and effective groundwater markets.
20.1 Groundwater Global Over Extraction and Shortage
Globally, groundwater extraction is the outcome of decisions by organisations and
individuals; there is little control or planning involved with its management.
Groundwater withdrawals supply a large percentage of the world’s population. It
accounts for about 50 % of global drinking water and 43 % of global irrigation
(van der Gun 2012). As detailed in Chap. 2, its overuse is associated with several
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negative externalities including: water drawdown and groundwater depletion; land
subsidence; loss of biodiversity; reduced dilution and assimilation of contaminants;
increased salinity; pollution; and seawater intrusion into coastal aquifers (Moreaux
and Reynaud 2004; Goesch et al. 2007). In some of the world’s most important food
producing regions, such as Punjabi in India, Northern Plains in China and the
Ogallala aquifer in the United States, over extraction has now reached levels
where it is apparent that it will not be possible in the longer term to support
irrigation at current levels (Shah 2009). It is thus a major threat to food security.
The extraction of groundwater during the twentieth century was mainly for
irrigation. Given the increasing impact of climate change on surface water avail-
ability, it is likely the pressure on groundwater will increase in the future (van der
Gun 2012). The Brundtland report in 1987 increased the awareness that there had
been over-allocation of water reserves and that groundwater was being drained
more quickly than it could be replenished. This led to the emergence of the concept
of ‘safe yields’, which set upper limits on the available water for use without
depleting storage. However, this did not protect the interests of other users of
water, notably the environment (Richardson et al. 2011).
20.1.1 Groundwater Features
Aquifers are recharged by rainwater, snow melt and returns from irrigated agricul-
ture. Sometimes water moves considerable distances underground. Aquifers can be
depleted if more water is extracted than the annual recharge. For several decades,
aquifers in arid and semi-arid regions have been stressed with a growing gap
between extraction and recharge. This has direct economic impacts because of
increased pumping costs for consumptive users and water degradation and ecosys-
tem damage (Esteban and Albiac 2012). Stocks of groundwater in aquifers are often
larger than surface water stocks. This makes them important buffers during
prolonged dry spells where, with reduced surface water availability and increased
demand, groundwater use typically increases during droughts (van der Gun 2012;
Goesch et al. 2007).
Groundwater management is more challenging than surface water management
because it is less visible and recharge is more difficult to measure than stream
inflows. Also, the hydraulic interconnectedness between different aquifers and
between aquifers and surface water is still not fully understood in many regions.
Groundwater is much more poorly monitored relative to surface water. It is only in
recent years that authorities in many countries have started to require meters to be
installed and monitored on bores (i.e., wells). For example, in Australia, by 2007
only 20–40 % of major groundwater users were monitored (Goesch et al. 2007).
Another feature of groundwater is its ‘shared water’ component; that is, the
interconnectedness of aquifers and streams. Shared water is that component that
feeds into a stream or river from an aquifer (gaining stream) or that discharges into
an aquifer from a river (losing stream). In some areas, a single river can gain and
lose water (Goesch et al. 2007). Some ecosystems, such as wetlands, small streams,
rivers, and lakes, are fed by aquifers (Esteban and Albiac 2012).
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Managing the quality of groundwater also poses a challenge, as problems such as
salinity are common (Chap. 15). The susceptibility to quality pollution depends on
the properties of the soil, climatic conditions, location of aquifers and factors such
as rainfall frequency. The type of cropping, as well as fertilizer and pesticide
application, also influence the risk of pollution. Short duration crops lead to greater
levels of leaching (Arthukorala and Wilson 2012). Further, certain irrigation
practices, failure to dispose of waste water properly and land clearing can all
decrease groundwater quality (NWC 2012).
To understand groundwater use, a model of groundwater flow systems is
required, including its sources and the spatial nature of natural and induced or
imposed recharge and discharge. Quantifying recharge from all sources is difficult,
as is determining the amount of water extracted. Thus where overuse is suspected,
regular measurement is essential (Athukorala and Wilson 2012).
20.2 Groundwater Policy Frameworks
In the 1990s there was a shift in thinking about water within the international
community. It was generally recognised that the possibilities of increasing water
supplies had ended and there should be a shift in focus to managing water demand
and reallocation. The global document Agenda 21, emerging from the Rio Conven-
tion in 1992, reflected this thinking and its main elements for dealing with water
shortage included the notions that:
• users should pay the full cost of water;
• water markets should be established;
• the community should be involved in the decision making process
• water use should be more efficient; and
• the environment must be recognized as a legitimate stakeholder (Sitarz 1993).
Strategies must be found to more purposefully allocate water in ways that
respond to competing demands, promote sustainability, prevent environmental
damage and generate economic efficiency. In general, existing diversions can be
reallocated or reduced through an administrative reallocation of water rights,
information approaches or market-oriented policy approaches (Bennett 2008).
Government managed ‘command and control’ approaches can be unpopular,
while market based instruments are frequently regarded as politically neutral, and
as an efficient means of managing water under conditions of scarcity (Skurray
et al. 2013). However, many countries are heavily influenced by political influences
which means second-best policy approaches are often chosen when first-best
policies are available (for example, see Crase (2011) for a discussion of the
Australian water situation). Markets, by contrast, allow for voluntary action
informed by price signals and market forces.
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20.2.1 Water Market Conditions
Before the establishment of water markets in any area, four broad elements are
needed to drive efficient use and outcomes. These are:
• A fixed limit to resource availability (set consumptive pool) that is ideally:
(i) credible and based on accurate science; (ii) monitored and enforced; and
(iii) consistent with sustainable levels of extraction;
• Users are provided with secure property rights in the form of an access entitle-
ment to a share of that consumptive pool;
• These shares, and the water allocated to them each season, are tradeable under
low transaction costs and entry/exit barrier conditions, such that ownership,
control and use can change over time; and
• Prices for these shares and allocations that take into account externality costs to
third-parties are established in amarket that uses the value placed onwater use by a
large pool of well-informed buyers and sellers (NWC 2011; Bjornlund et al. 2013;
Loch et al. 2013).
For groundwater markets in particular, there need to be well-defined rights with
limited groundwater use allocations and monitoring of groundwater extraction by
all users. These rights and allocation levels need to be based on a good understand-
ing of the hydrogeology of a groundwater area, groundwater mobility and its
sustainable yield, along with knowledge of dependent ecosystems and the way
the aquifer responds to extraction. However, caution needs to be taken that property
rights to water can be reduced when necessary for environmental or climate
purposes, or due to uncertainty about watershed hydrology. It has been proposed
that sustainable yield be managed by defining lower and upper bounds for water
table levels and monitor them (Anderson and Snyder 1997). Entrenching property
rights in water can be problematic. Firstly, there is the issue of dozer and sleeper
rights (e.g. unused or unutilized water rights). For example, establishing water
markets in Australia activated many unused licences, and reduced the water left
in the river. Secondly, enshrining property rights holds dangers if there is incom-
plete knowledge of riverine ecosystems and future environmental needs for water
(Crase et al. 2004; Young 2014).
20.2.2 Difficulties in Establishing Groundwater Markets
Bauer (1997) argues that establishing markets in water resources is difficult. Water
markets are not natural or self-maintaining. Further, the institutional frameworks,
the political and economic conditions, as well as geographic context are important
influences on market function. Regulation is necessary to prevent third party effects
and externalities. Despite the need to clearly define property rights, some aspects of
water resources are inherently public goods and represent collective interests.
Government oversight is also very important for markets to work effectively,
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particularly in relation to assessing trade applications, monitoring and reporting on
the state of ground and surface water resources and market performance, revising
trading rules as appropriate and ensuring water management plans are adequate
(GHD et al. 2011). However, markets are embedded in institutions which can either
facilitate or impede their optimal functioning. High transaction costs can be a
significant disincentive to trade and they are likely to be particularly relevant
when establishing new markets since they involve a change from historical systems
of water management. Such costs can arise from the transaction itself or they can be
generated by the institutional factors that are necessary in enabling trade (Skurray
et al. 2013; Garrick et al. 2009).
20.2.2.1 Property Right Issues
The characteristics of groundwater and surface water and their interaction differ in
ways that lead to various challenges in defining property rights to each type of
resource. These differences also affect the complexities involved in developing
water markets.
With surface water, movement across boundaries can be difficult to control.
Moreover simultaneous and sequential users of water make exclusion difficult and
create numerous interdependencies. Thus, multiple parties can be affected by
surface water trading. Also, in some countries, individuals do not own water; it is
owned by the state and held in trust for individual citizens, creating a legal
impediment to developing property rights. There is also a chronological hierarchy
in claims to water (similar to the framework of high, medium and low security
water rights used in countries such as Australia) which may not be correlated to the
value of its use (Brewer et al. 2008).
Surface water markets also depend on conveyance opportunities and the absence
of canals, or rivers, to move water can decrease arbitrage opportunities. Markets
tend to be local because of regulation between different states and the cost of
transporting water over long distances (Brewer et al. 2008). It is essential that
market boundaries are clearly defined; this relates to physical boundaries as well as
volumetric ones. Finally, Crase et al. (2004) suggest that efficiency improvements
may not return water to the environment unless there are institutional mechanisms
to direct saved water to environmental flows.
In contrast, groundwater aquifers have many of the characteristics of a common
property resource where the location of the user is important. Early work on
groundwater management (e.g., Gisser and Sanchez 1980; Gisser 1983) modelled
groundwater as a spatially homogeneous common property resource (i.e., the
“bathtub” model), where one individual’s groundwater use immediately affected
all other users equally. More recent work (e.g., Brozovic´ et al. 2010) shows that
while groundwater aquifers have some characteristics of a common property
resource, the impact of one individual’s use on other users varies over space and
time from one aquifer to another, depending on hydrological characteristics. This
distinction is important for the appropriate definition of property rights and the
region where trading is permitted. It is important for policymakers to first set the
20 Lessons to Be Learned from Groundwater Trading in Australia and the United. . . 497
total level of groundwater use rights for an aquifer to a sustainable level, then the
important task is the distribution of those rights over the aquifer.
Given the inherent and manifold difficulties in specifying property rights in
groundwater, greater specification of rights and their conditions seems a tempting
option. However, greater specification decreases the ease of transferability of rights.
The greater the degree of specification, the thinner the market and the less benefits it
will generate. The alternative to extensive specification of property rights is
introducing other measures to prevent environmental and other third party effects
(Skurray et al. 2013).
Aquifers can vary markedly in terms of their hydrogeological properties, with
consequent variation in the ease of extracting water, the capacity for recharge, the
difficulty of specifying property rights and the external costs associated with
accessing groundwater from them. Therefore, it may be difficult to expect manage-
ment regimes to be applied to a number of different aquifers. Furthermore, man-
agement regimes are often embedded in administrative jurisdictions that do not
necessarily align with the boundaries of aquifers. Decision making must therefore
address and integrate interconnected natural systems. A further element of flexibil-
ity relates to the temporal variation in aquifer ‘behaviour’. Responsiveness to
changing conditions should override a reliance on rigidly applied and upheld
regulations (Skurray et al. 2013).
The physical differences between surface water and groundwater systems also
affect the ease of monitoring water use. Well-defined property rights that are
quantifiable and can be monitored are essential for a water market. Surface water
systems are more likely to have (but note this is far from certain) a well-developed
infrastructure of rivers and canals that make quantifying water use relatively
straightforward. Water flows can be measured at each point of diversion to deter-
mine water use by individuals or communities. By contrast, groundwater is gener-
ally extracted through a network of individual wells, which are interconnected
horizontally depending on geology. Quantifying water use can require installing
flow meters at each well and collecting information on actual water use.
Quantifying use also can be estimated by a range of various models. While the
monitoring technology is readily available to collect this information for ground-
water use, the cost of doing so is higher for groundwater than for surface water
systems. The higher monitoring cost is one reason that many areas have been slower
to limit groundwater than surface water. In addition, the interconnectedness of
groundwater and surface water adds to the complexity of establishing property
rights. Property rights to surface water and groundwater need to be coordinated to
incorporate the physical connection between the two resources.
20.2.2.2 Externalities
Due to the common pool ownership of aquifers, and the unique physical properties
of aquifers, externalities are easily created. Because of the spatially-dynamic nature
of groundwater flow, the extent of various externalities depends on the quantity,
location and time of extraction and the strategic behaviour of users. In a competitive
and unregulated setting, the temporal and spatial profile of external effects results in
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inefficient pricing and misallocation; users take too much, too quickly and from
what may be considered the wrong locations (e.g. closer to surface water rivers).
Individual users of groundwater have, in the absence of regulation or other
incentives, little reason to consider the increased pumping costs for other users as
a result of the extraction they undertake (Katic and Grafton 2012). Nor is there
much incentive to consider future costs associated with reduced stock. Finally, they
have little reason to consider the impact of their activities on surface water, where
groundwater extractions can decrease the amount of surface water available
(Goesch et al. 2007). Regulation is needed. Groundwater is not used optimally by
individuals who do not internalize the part of the extraction costs and environmen-
tal externalities in their pumping decisions. Extraction by one user will deplete the
water supply and, because users believe competitors will not conserve water, there
is little incentive to protect the storage. This is a significant reason for market failure
and highlights the need for institutional arrangements. A key issue is therefore
whether markets are capable of achieving balanced inter-temporal allocation of
resources (Esteban and Albiac 2012).
20.3 Actual Groundwater Trade
Notwithstanding the complexity of the physical influences on groundwater, its use
is also inextricably linked with socio-economic, legal, institutional and political
systems. There are several drivers of groundwater access and use: other water
sources; demographic and socio-economic factors; science and technological
innovation; policies, laws and financial conditions; climate variability and market
changes (changed demand, changed renewal, availability of other sources) (van der
Gun 2012).
Surface water markets around the world occur mainly in semiarid areas and
include: United States (mostly in the western states), Chile (Limarı´ River Valley),
Australia (Murray-Darling Basin), Spain, Canada (South Saskatchewan River Basin),
South Africa, China, Brazil, Mexico and Tanzania (Loch et al. 2013; Wheeler et al.
2014). All water markets can be hampered by political, technical, social and admin-
istrative factors. However, markets in groundwater face some particular challenges,
including the three dimensional nature of aquifers, boundary uncertainties, water
quality variation and local drawdown impacts. Groundwater markets are less com-
mon than surface water markets but some exist in Australia (Skurray et al. 2013;
Skurray and Pannell 2010), China (Zhang et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2007), Oman
(Zekri and Al-Marshudi 2008; Al-Marshudi 2007), the Indian Subcontinent
(Meinzen-Dick 1998; Shah 1993; Easter et al. 1998) and the United States (Colby
2000; Colby and Bush 1987; Anderson and Snyder 1997; Griffin 1998).
The specific details of markets can vary by location. For example, in China,
Oman, and India groundwater trading typically occurs when water is sold and
transported to be used on non-adjacent land. In Australia and the United States
groundwater trading generally involves selling the right to pump water from a
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shared aquifer. However, some of the major groundwater transfers in the US have
taken place by purchasing water farms and pumping the water to distant cities,
especially in Arizona, with detrimental impact on exporting regions This distant
pumping has also taken place in California and Texas (Colby and Bush 1987;
Anderson and Snyder 1997). The Omani and Indian/Pakistan groundwater markets
provide some interesting insights on groundwater opportunities and problems. A
brief discussion is provided in Box 20.1.
Box 20.1: Examples of Groundwater Markets in Developing Countries
India and Pakistan
Informal groundwater markets have developed in India and Pakistan
where irrigation water is supplied from deep tubewells which are costly to
install (Meinzen-Dick 1998; Shah 1993; Easter et al. 1998). This excludes
small farmers from accessing water. However, many of them can buy water
from large farmers with excess capacity. There are various arrangements for
payment: (i) the buyer pays an agreed amount or works for the larger farm in
exchange for water; (ii) two-way share farming: one party supplies the water,
the other the land and labour and all share net profits; (iii) three-way share
farming: one party supplies the water, another the land and the third the
labour and all share net profits.
These groundwater markets increase availability and reliability of water
supplies; but the ability to sell water, combined with subsidized electricity
prices, encourages over-extraction of groundwater. This results in increased
pumping costs, elimination of use of shallow wells, and increased saline
aquifers.
Oman
A unique groundwater market has developed in Oman within the falaj
irrigation systems (Zekri and Al-Marshudi 2008; Al-Marshudi 2007;
Bjornlund and Bjornlund 2010). There are 1,000 year old underground
water mobilization systems tapping water from the top of mountain aquifers
and transporting it by gravity-driven tunnels and canals to villages and fields
(with domestic use given first priority). The system can only tap the aquifer’s
overflow, and access is granted in flow time only; hence access is correspond-
ingly reduced in times of shortage. In most systems, the majority of water is
controlled by the village community and semi-public charity organizations,
such as the mosques. Many farmers are dependent on buying water access
either on a weekly or annual basis. The proceeds from the weekly auctions are
used to pay for the administration and maintenance of the falaj system, while
the water controlled by semi-public organizations is sold annually and the
proceeds go towards community activities. Many of the systems are currently
under threat due to external encroachment on this communal resource
(e.g. farmers have sunk tube wells into aquifers supplying the falaj systems).
The remainder of this paper studies in detail two of the most advanced countries
in the world in terms of groundwater trading: Australia and the United States.
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20.3.1 Australia
In Australia, groundwater has typically been: (i) unmetered; (ii) provided free or at
low prices; and (iii) ‘managed’ by management plans, which have not properly
considered the connectivity between surface and groundwater (NWC 2012).
Groundwater use almost doubled between 1983/4 and 1996/7, but this average
masks a tripling in the states of New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia
(where much of Perth’s drinking water supply comes from groundwater). Under the
National Water Initiative (NWI), Australian governments are committed to:
• improving knowledge of ground-surface water connectivity;
• returning all over-allocated systems to sustainable levels of extraction;
• improving understanding of what is a sustainable extraction rate; and
• improving understanding of the relationship between groundwater and ground-
water dependent ecosystems (NWC 2008).
The National Groundwater Action Plan, arising from the 2007 evaluation of
progress of the NWI, seeks to take the actions needed to achieve these outcomes.
The National Water Commission (NWC) concluded in 2008 that ongoing use of
groundwater for consumptive use from ‘stressed’ aquifers and connected systems is
an ‘unacceptable risk’. They then developed a set of principles to guide subsequent
action (NWC 2008). Developing water markets in groundwater was one such
consideration, though there were many considerations that needed addressing first
(Goesch et al. 2007).
In 2004–05, ABS (2006) estimated that groundwater access entitlements
accounted for 146,185 (or 65 %) of all water access entitlements and 6,998 GL of
water allocated in Australia. As at June 2012, NWC (2013) suggested there were
81,719 groundwater entitlements issued, covering about 6,600 GLs (the majority
are in New South Wales, followed by Western Australia, Victoria, Queensland and
South Australia) (Table 20.1).
Table 20.1 Groundwater entitlements on issue at 30 June 2012
Jurisdiction Number Volume (GL)
New South Wales (NSW) 47,835 2,056
Queensland (Qld) 8,153 1,008
Victoria (Vic) 8,956 950
Western Australia (WA) 11,400 1,713
South Australia (SA) 4,911 620
Tasmania (Tas) 0 0
Northern Territory (NT) 232 125
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) 262 76
Total 81,719 6,596
Source: NWC (2013)
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Groundwater entitlement trading made up only about 12 % of total trade in
Australia in 2011–12 (NWC 2013). The number and volume of entitlement and
allocation trade is shown in Table 20.2.
20.3.1.1 Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) Groundwater Trade
In the MDB, most surface and groundwaters are hydraulically linked; meaning that
overuse of surface water will deplete aquifers, while increased groundwater extrac-
tion will adversely affect the supply of surface water. Groundwater comprises about
15 % of irrigation water in the MDB, but this can increase to over 70 % in some
catchments in extended dry conditions (Richardson et al. 2011).
As of 2012, annual groundwater extractions from the MDB were 1,744 GL per
annum. However, the MDB Plan allows for an increase up to a total of 4,340 GLs
annually. Of this increase, 760 GL is due to be extracted from aquifers that need to
have extractions reduced or capped. In some areas of the MDB, extraction exceeds
recharge capacity with poor long term outcomes for groundwater levels
(Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists 2012).
Policies and guidelines for sustainable groundwater extraction are currently being
developed. In the past, an extraction limit was defined as part of a technical process
and then announced via a water plan. This has worked reasonably well, but has led to
some tensions. These tensions were mainly about the over-extraction of groundwater
because of a development imperative, unchecked by knowledge of the ecological
needs served by, and dependent on, groundwater (Richardson et al. 2011).
In some areas people use groundwater in dry periods to augment the supplies
they receive from surface water (NWC 2011). Groundwater trade is permitted in
New South Wales, South Australia, Victoria, the Northern Territory and Western
Australia. However only a small amount of trade has occurred (e.g. Tables 20.2,
20.3, and 20.4).
Table 20.4 indicates that groundwater and unregulated trade only made up 2 %
of total MDB water allocation trade in 2011–12, while Table 20.3 shows it made up
14 % of total MDB water entitlement trade. Overall, groundwater trading within the
southern MDB increased significantly during the 2000s from 2–5 % of total
groundwater use to 10–20 % (NWC 2010).
One of the first active groundwater markets was in the Northern Adelaide Plains,
where urban encroachments into market gardening areas left many ground water
Table 20.2 Groundwater entitlement and allocation trading in 2011–12
Qld NSW Vic SA WA NT Tas ACT
Entitlement (no) 0 208 304 202 68 0 0 0
Entitlement volume
(ML)
0 84,377 35,325 15,725 11,004 0 0 0
Allocation (no) 62 134 97 41 29 0 0 0
Allocation volume
(ML)
3,688 26,972 7,524 2,147 4,255 0 0 0
Source: NWC (2013)
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licenses unused. Trading was allowed to enable this water to move to remaining
market gardeners. However, this caused water extraction to concentrate withdrawal
in the most productive region and after only 4 years of trading a large cone of
depression developed in this area. This resulted in the introduction of zones and
trade limitation between some zones (Boyd and Brumley 2004).
Access to groundwater for irrigation is governed by entitlement and is usually
separate from land and other property rights. Generally, each entitlement specifies
the volume that irrigators can extract in a given year. But some entitlements specify
daily pumping rates, while others specify additional volumes that can be withdrawn
during droughts. Extraction in some areas is not sustainable. Sustainability is
formulated by assessing extractions against sustainable yield. There is variation
in the definition of sustainable yield. The National Groundwater Committee defines
it as an extraction regime that allows acceptable levels of stress and protects
economic, social and environmental values. This recognizes the trade-offs between
competing uses (Goesch et al. 2007).
In the Namoi groundwater area in NSW, there is well developed trading in
groundwater because of several initiatives. Firstly, over-allocation was addressed.
This has allowed the setting of total extraction limits, with annual allocations
announced at the beginning of the year. The key elements of successful trading
activity in NSW are:
• high demand for groundwater;
• water sharing plans for aquifers based on sound scientific knowledge;
• access to perpetual licenses for users;
• transparent trading rules;
• efficient approval processes; and
• a system for metering and monitoring is in place (NWC 2011).
Table 20.3 Australian
water trade volumes
(GL) in 2011–12 Water entitlements
MDB regulated 1,065
MDB unregulated and groundwater 153
Other water systems 218
Australia total 1,437
Source: Adapted from data in NWC (2013)
Table 20.4 Water allocation trading volumes (GL), Australia, 2007–08 to 2011–12
2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12
MDB Regulated 1,376 1,663 2,118 3,340 4,127
MDB Unregulated and
groundwater
17 290 183 76 89
MDB total 1,393 1,953 2,301 3,417 4,216
Other water systems 201 205 194 77 81
Total Australia 1,594 2,158 2,495 3,493 4,297
Source: NWC (2013)
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Table 20.5 illustrates the trade in groundwater and surface water allocations over
the past 6 years. It highlights that groundwater trade was highest in the drought
years of 2006–07 and 2007–08, while surface water trade is higher in years of
higher rainfall (and higher water allocations).
Groundwater trade is comparatively much less developed in Victoria than in
NSW. There seem to be a number of reasons for the under-developed trade in
Victoria: (1) historical reliance on bulk water supply provider systems; (2) some
groundwater regions are not fully allocated; (3) incomplete resource planning; and
(4) underdeveloped market rules and institutions. In Victoria, just less than half of
the groundwater management units are considered over-allocated, while 12 % are
considered less than 50 % allocated. Within under-allocated units, new licenses are
being issued and there is little incentive for trade. Furthermore, many ‘sleeper’
licenses have been issued. This would limit trade even in over-allocated areas, as
many current licence holders already have the capacity to expand. However, there
is compelling evidence that groundwater levels are declining in Victoria. Therefore,
if increasing groundwater extraction continues, the predicted consequences of
climate change eventuate and there is lack of recharge following drought, demand
for trade should increase (NWC 2011).
A second barrier to trade in Victoria is lack of planning for management of
groundwater resources. In areas designated as Water Supply Protection areas,
trading in or out is not permitted until a management plan for the area has been
developed. There have been delays in developing such plans because of lack of
knowledge about aquifers and sustainable yields (again due to historical reliance on
surface water systems and a lack of development on groundwater). In other areas,
where trade in groundwater has been developed, or has the potential for such
development, caps need to be set to ensure the volume that can be taken from a
given groundwater management area in a given period is established. This requires
defining the boundaries of the area so that they align with the hydrogeological
boundaries of the aquifer and ensure that the boundaries of groundwater and surface
water align. Without this consistent establishment of boundaries, it is difficult to
properly manage the asset. There are a number of administrative barriers to
groundwater trade in Victoria. These include unbundled licenses, licenses that are
of short duration, lack of clarity about the basis for reducing seasonal allocations
and complex and restrictive trading rules (NWC 2011).
Table 20.5 Groundwater and surface water allocation trade volumes, Namoi, 2006–07 to
2011–12 (ML)
2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12
Groundwater
allocation trade
12,155 12,543 10,210 9,102 6,096 3,997
Surface water
allocation trade
n.a. 5,598 12,581 12,151 17,516 23,462
Source: NWC (2013)
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20.3.1.2 Western Australia
In 2011–12, there were over 11,000 ML of groundwater entitlements traded nation-
ally and 4,255 ML of these groundwater allocations were traded in Western
Australia (NWC 2013). In the Gnangara aquifer of Western Australia, the legal
rights associated with a 10 year licence for a volume of groundwater are signifi-
cantly attenuated because unused portions of water may be reclaimed by the
relevant Minister. Rights can also be ‘amended’ by the Minister in order to protect
third parties. In addition, the Government can amend a license if the reason for the
use of water is not appropriate. Further, licences are time limited and do not
represent an unconditionally owned asset. There are up to 80 conditions that relate
to well depth, monitoring, infrastructure, reporting and time of use requirements
(Skurray et al. 2013). Thus the property rights entailed by having a licence for
Gnangara groundwater is administratively restricted, purpose limited, and time
limited with conditional rights that are vulnerable to cancellation or amendment.
While it might be argued that the Government control of certain aspects of water
rights is a means to guarantee sustainable management of the resource, this has not
proved to be the case. The current arrangements do not meet the NWI’s guidelines
for the creation of effective markets, despite the fact that the WA government is a
signatory to the agreement. Transfers of water can only be made to a person who
either owns, or occupies, the land on which the water will be used, or they must
have written permission from the land owner to use the land for activities which are
deemed appropriate under the conditions of the water licence. These significantly
constrain the transferability of licences. The process for applying to transfer water
is cumbersome, expensive and does not adequately maintain confidentiality. More-
over, even where transfers are approved by the Minister’s office, they can be
overridden by local regulations (Skurray et al. 2013).
20.3.2 United States of America (US)
Of critical importance in understanding the existence and potential for groundwater
trading in the United States is the fact that water law is generally determined at the
state level, as opposed to the federal level. There are some exceptions (e.g. the
Endangered Species Act, which trumps state-level decisions when the habitat of an
endangered species is at risk, or compacts that regulate interstate rivers such as the
Colorado River). However, most groundwater law, including the rights structure,
regulation, and the potential for groundwater trading varies by state and some states
have further devolved groundwater management to regions, counties, or basins. For
example, Texas groundwater law has historically given landowners an absolute
right to use groundwater below the land, while Nebraska law is defined by “reason-
able use” and “correlative” rights, which mean that groundwater users are expected
to manage the resource jointly and restrictions affect all users equally.
The Edwards Aquifer in Texas has implemented regulation that restricts ground-
water use and allows trading but the changes are not comprehensive across the state.
In fact, in 2011 the Texas Legislature passed a bill that upheld the interpretation that
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landowners that are not in the Edwards Aquifer management area have “a vested
ownership interest in and right to produce groundwater below the surface” (Eckhardt
2013). Kansas and Idaho use appropriative rights for groundwater so that groundwa-
ter is managed based on a “first in time, first in right” basis. Arizona regulates
groundwater use based on a state law that requires an assured water supply for
users (Megdal 2012), while California has little groundwater regulation at the state
level, but allows local areas to develop more restrictions (Hanak 2003; Jacobs 2006).
States in the western parts of the US enshrined the environment’s right to water
under common law doctrines. However, given that these regulatory and adminis-
trative regimes are implemented by individual states, the result is very uneven in
terms of the amount of reform achieved in each jurisdiction. Increasingly, private
entities have engaged in buying or leasing high security water for the environment.
As this activity has increased, so too has monitoring, scrutiny of transfer and
enforcement of regulations (Garrick et al. 2009). While most of the purchases of
water for environmental benefits have been for surface water, there are some cases
where protecting environmental quality also helps groundwater resources. For
example, protecting natural wetlands such as the playa system in the Southern
High Plains has environmental benefits via the provision of important habitat and
also helps recharge groundwater aquifers (Bolen et al. 1989).
Another important distinction between surface and groundwater rights is the
incentive to use water. While the details vary by state, western states in the United
States generally use the prior appropriation system for surface water. Under prior
appropriation, failure to continue using water can result in rights being lost; this is a
disincentive to using less water and those who save water often see it forfeited to
others. This creates a situation in which there are rewards for using a lot of water to
grow low value crops. California eliminated this disincentive with a regulation that
allowed water saved to be sold, leased or transferred (Brewer et al. 2008). However,
Garrick et al. (2009) suggests that the prior appropriation doctrine establishes an
implicit cap on the amount of water available, which has been an incentive to the
development of trading. In contrast, groundwater rights are more frequently deter-
mined on the basis of land ownership and are less likely to be subject to a “use it or
lose it” clause.1 While this reduces the incentive for overuse, it fails to provide the
implicit cap on available water.
Brewer et al. (2008) found in their review of surface water markets in the US
that:
1. Agriculture is the origin for many of the transactions;
2. The annual flow of water traded and the amount of water committed for transfer
show different patterns;
1 This varies by state. In some states (e.g., Idaho, Montana) groundwater rights are based on prior
appropriation and can be lost if unused. Other states (e.g., Arizona, California, Nebraska, and
Texas) base rights on land ownership, making it difficult to lose a right if the land or pumping right
is not sold.
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3. Number of trade transactions is increasing (mainly accounted for by agriculture-
to-urban trades);
4. Sales and multi-year leases are growing, while 1 year leases are not;
5. Arizona, Texas and California are among the top four states on any measure of
trading;
6. Agriculture -to-urban trades account for most permanent trades on committed
trade measures, while agriculture -to- agriculture trades account for most of the
annual leases;
7. In comparing sales and leases across a number of US western states, prices
varied more across states than across sectors and this differential reflects
differences in demand and supply characteristics, transaction type, transaction
costs and regulatory restrictions that prevent arbitrage across states. Sales are
more common than leases of water (because of the greater security they provide)
and this is reflected in increasing sales prices while those for leases have
declined relatively; and
8. Finally, the price data reveal that urban users pay considerably more for water
than agricultural users.
In contrast to surface water, in most places groundwater rights are not quantified;
that is, there is no legal right for users to withdraw a specific amount of water. Thus
there is a general right for all those who are located above the aquifer to pump from
it. Basins where the rights to groundwater are specified are located primarily in
urban areas. They usually charge pumping fees and manage recharge programs.
The development of clearly defined and limited property rights to groundwater is a
necessary condition for further development of groundwater trading.
20.3.2.1 California
While surface water markets were introduced in California in the late 1970s, the
factors leading to their expansion in the 1990s were severe drought and government
mandated environmental flows. Trade was initially spurred by dry years, but has
persisted since the return of normal precipitation. In its early stages, most transfers
were short term trades such as 1 year leases, but the percentage of longer term leases
and permanent sales has increased. The proportion of sales has fluctuated but the
trend in longer term leases is sustained. Since the late 1980s, the percentage of
water bought or leased for cities and the environment has continued to increase
relative to other uses (Hanak and Stryjewski 2012). However, there is some
indication that overall trade has slowed in recent years (Hanak and Stryjewski
2012).
California provides an interesting example of water regulation and trading, with
surface water laws clearly defined and a thriving surface water market, while
groundwater regulation and associated trading is extremely limited and very little
data exist. While groundwater management is improving in the state overall, it is
still largely a voluntary system and groundwater regulations are primarily deter-
mined at a local level (Hanak and Stryjewski 2012). Groundwater is an important
source of ‘wet water’ in California and groundwater transfers are subject to less
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oversight by the state than surface water since the state’s water code does not cover
groundwater (Hanak and Stryjewski 2012). Historically this meant that there was
little regulation over groundwater use. This was highlighted after many surface
water irrigators sold their water rights to the state in the drought of the late 1980s
and early 1990s, only to respond by pumping groundwater as a substitute. This
trend has not changed and the same pattern of irrigators substituting groundwater
for limited surface water availability was also seen in the late 2000s (Famiglietti
et al. 2011).
Groundwater banking has emerged as an important tool in California’s water
management, which involves the deliberate storage of surface water in aquifers
during wet years (Hanak 2005). Since 2000, the state has been making active
attempts to facilitate groundwater storage, which is part of the strategy to encourage
conjunctive use of water as part of a diversification process (Hanak and Stryjewski
2012). The term “groundwater banking” is a misnomer: while a useful tool for
managing water, in most parts of the state it is really a conjunctive management
system although the details are case-specific. For example, some districts that use
groundwater are purchasing surface water to augment local aquifers for local use. In
other cases, municipalities are purchasing storage space in existing aquifers to store
surface water. Groundwater banking describes the practice of storing surface water
in natural or created aquifers during wet periods to save the water for dry periods.
There are many benefits of groundwater banking for overall water management. It
is a relatively cost-effective way to bolster water supplies especially in drought
times. It also will help mitigate the loss of seasonal storage provided historically by
the Sierra Nevada snowpack, which is expected because of climate change.
Groundwater banking has become common in California (Hanak and Stryjewski
2012) and in Arizona (Megdal 2012) but typically does not actually involve the
transfer of existing (i.e. natural) groundwater. However, any transfer of the banked
water is often limited by local ordinances, limiting the benefits of water trading
(Hanak and Stryjewski 2012).
There is a history of aquifers being drained, with adverse consequences for other
users in California. This background helps to explain the development of local
ordinances and the contemporary resistance to groundwater export from local
communities. Many of the local ordinances restrict the export of groundwater.
These ordinances are a significant deterrent to groundwater trade, which in many
areas make groundwater transfers more difficult than surface water trades (Hanak
2003; Hanak and Stryjewski 2012). The efficiency of the approvals process for
handling transfers is an important determinant of benefits of a market. Some
counties place restrictions on groundwater exports and limitations on groundwater
substitution transfers, while some aim to restrict groundwater banking with
non-local parties. There are no state level ‘no injury’ groundwater protection
statutes that can regulate groundwater (Hanak and Stryjewski 2012). In addition,
there is local resistance to recent attempts by the state to collect information on
groundwater use and groundwater levels. Without such information it is nearly
impossible to develop a well-managed system of regulated groundwater rights that
can facilitate groundwater trading.
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In summary, California provides an interesting example that shows strong
differences in the approach to developing trade in groundwater versus surface
water. However, despite the growing maturity of the surface water market, overall
trade has been declining since 2003, despite some drought years since 2000. A
number of factors appear to explain the reduction in surface water trade. New
pumping restrictions since 2007 have impeded north to south and east to west
transfers around the Delta. Aspects of the approval process have also impeded
transfers (Hanak and Stryjewski 2012). At the same time, county ordinances have
limited groundwater transfers. These transfers are subject to environmental
strictures over and above those related to the ‘no injury’ to environmental flows.
In both surface and groundwater, recent high commodity prices are associated with
a reluctance to lease/sell water. Finally, the existence of different kinds of water
rights with separate approval processes has dampened the market. Overall, devel-
oping a more robust groundwater market will require additional restrictions to limit
groundwater use and well-defined property rights that are streamlined across
different counties.
20.3.2.2 Nebraska
Nebraska has developed a system where groundwater law is developed at the state
level but administered and managed at a local level. Groundwater law follows a
system of correlative rights, which means that all groundwater users have equal
rights to use the resource. The state is divided into 23 natural resource districts, or
NRDs. The NRD boundaries are determined by watersheds and each NRD has
responsibility for managing natural resources such as groundwater and soil. Each
NRD has substantial autonomy in choosing how to interpret and apply any state
groundwater laws, and they frequently impose additional regulations above state
limits. In contrast, surface water use is managed by the state using a prior appropri-
ation system.
Unlike states such as California that rely primarily on surface water,2 ground-
water is the major source of water for Nebraska, providing approximately 85 % of
total water used (Kenny et al. 2009). Historically surface water and groundwater
law in the state were separate. However, legal changes since the mid-1990s have
provided legal recognition to the many hydraulically-connected surface and
groundwater systems in the state. Much of the state’s groundwater is connected
to surface water basins, including the Platte River Basin and the Republican River
Basin. A law passed in 2004 (Legislative Bill 962) requires many of the NRDs to
cooperatively develop integrated management plans (IMPs) to specify how hydrau-
lically connected groundwater and surface water will be jointly managed. One
outcome of this change is that groundwater wells need to be certified, registered,
and metered in much of the state. In addition to metering, many NRDs have set
groundwater allocations for each well, establishing binding property rights for
groundwater users. This combination of factors has allowed some of the NRDs to
2Approximately 80 % of total water use in California is from surface water (Kenny et al 2009).
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permit groundwater trading to be used to improve the economic efficiency of
groundwater use. However, variation exists between the approaches used by differ-
ent NRDs:
Upper Republican Natural Resource District (URNRD): The URNRD was an early
adopter of groundwater regulation. This primarily rural district, located in
southwest Nebraska, initially required all irrigation wells to install flow meters
in 1979. Use restrictions were also implemented in the same year, although the
initial allocation levels were sufficiently high that users were not constrained.
Allocations are determined for a multi-year period (typically for 5 years) and the
allocations have gradually decreased. Initial water allocations were set at
5,610 m3/year/hectare and current allocations are 3,315 m3/year/hectare (RRB
2013). The expansion of acres is controlled, setting a cap on total water use. The
allocation rights are allocated to each field based on the size of the field. Given
the binding allocations and history of monitoring, the URNRD is well-suited for
groundwater trading.
In the URNRD, an irrigator can transfer part of his/her water allocation to
another irrigator if the water will be used within a confined geographical region
(9,324 hectares). This constraint has advantages and disadvantages. The
advantages are that it reduces regional economic impacts associated with the
transfer of groundwater and can reduce the chance of cones of depression, where
groundwater pumping is concentrated in a small area. Disadvantages accrue
from limiting potential trading partners, reducing the potential economic
benefits of trade. Relative to surface water, groundwater transfers have few
technical impediments since the right to pump is transferred as opposed to the
wet water. One impediment to groundwater transfers has been high transaction
costs. There is no mechanism to help prospective buyers and sellers find trade
partners. In addition to formally transferring allocation, the URNRD also allows
an irrigator to combine the pumping rights to all of his/her land in a limited
geographical area. This creates a defined set of fields (referred to as a “pool”).
Total groundwater use is limited for the pool of fields, but the irrigator can
choose how to distribute the total allocation between fields. This allows flexibil-
ity to move water from one field to another due to differences in soil type or crop
choice. Many producers use pools to help manage their water allocation, and this
suggests that reducing the transaction costs for formal trading would lead to
more trades and greater economic benefits. In a recent analysis, Juchems (2013)
found that indicators of profitability such as soil type, depth to groundwater, and
pumping capacity are strong indicators of the direction of trade in both formal
trades and within-pool transfers.
Lower Republican Natural Resource District (LRNRD): As with the URNRD, the
LRNRD establishes multi-year groundwater allocations for irrigators. Due to
changes in state law, the NRD began metering and limiting groundwater
allocations in 2005. Unlike the URNRD, transfers of groundwater allocation are
not permitted. Research suggests that modifying the rules to allow groundwater
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transfers would have economic benefits, and would allow the NRD to reduce
overall groundwater use at a very low cost (Palazzo and Brozovic´ 2014).
Central Platte Natural Resource District (CPNRD): The motivation for improved
water management is different in the Platte River Basin than in the Republican
River Basin. Both are interstate rivers and restrictions on hydraulically
connected groundwater in the Republican River Basin have been necessary to
provide enough water to Kansas (the downstream state). In contrast, restrictions
on hydraulically connected groundwater in the Platte River Basin are designed to
improve instream flow for endangered species. A series of interstate agreements
and legislative changes between 1997 and 2006 led to the current restrictions and
water management plan for the CPNRD.
The CPNRD has developed a number of tools to help groundwater users
manage their water allocation. First, the CPNRD allows groundwater users to
transfer (trade) the right to pump groundwater to another location. Transfers are
permitted between the NRD and other NRDs as long as the transfer is approved
(CPNRD 2012). The permitting process is designed to ensure that any transfer
does not lead to additional depletion from the river. As seen in the URNRD, one-
to-one transfers can have high transaction costs due to the difficulty of finding a
trading partner. In addition to one-to-one transfers, the CPNRD has developed a
water bank. To date most of the water bank activities have been permanent
buyouts of irrigated land (both groundwater and surface water). However, the
water bank has been designed to also permit some flexibility, with individual
producers able to purchase water. While the program is still fairly new, the
centralized system is expected to lead to lower transaction costs, more trades,
and higher economic benefits from water use.
While each of the 23 NRDs differs in their approach to managing groundwater,
these three examples highlight some of the groundwater trading activities that are
already occurring. Jointly, these three case studies show evidence that there is
demand for transfers and flexibility when it is permitted. The URNRD, which is
fairly restrictive with formal transfers, had approximately 40 transfers during the
2005–2011 period (Juchems 2013). Transfers within a pool of fields are extremely
common. The CPNRD has a more established system for transfers, and has
approved many transfers. Thus, a key lesson from these experiences is that even
with high transaction costs, there are economic benefits from groundwater transfers.
While local control of groundwater resources is politically important across the
state, the differences between districts illustrate how economic efficiency may be
improved by relaxing constraints on groundwater trading and reducing transaction
costs. Transferring the right to pump water, instead of moving water, reduces
transportation costs but without oversight may lead to the problem of more inten-
sive pumping in a small area, resulting in cones of depression.
20.3.2.3 Edwards Aquifer (Texas)
Texas has historically had a rule of capture for groundwater, where a landowner has
the right to use groundwater below his or her land. While some of the state still
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operates under a ‘rule of capture’, the Edwards Aquifer in south-central Texas
provides an example of groundwater management that includes some restrictions
on use and permits groundwater trading. Motivated by threats to endangered
species’ habitat that depend on aquifer flow, the Texas legislature passed Senate
Bill 1477 (SB 1477, known as the Edwards Aquifer Authority Act) in 1993 (Boadu
et al. 2007). SB 1477 changed the water rights structure for groundwater users,
created a permit system that gave a right to use a specified quantity of water, and
created the Edwards Aquifer Authority (EAA). While some initial rights were
allocated in the late 1990s, many water users felt the allocation was unjust, leading
to extensive litigation (Colby 2000). A series of legal challenges delayed the
assigning of most water rights until 2001 and 2002, when the legal authority of
the EAA to restrict groundwater use was upheld by the Texas Supreme Court
(Eckhardt 2013). Legal challenges have continued to lengthen the process of
regulating the Edwards Aquifer, reducing the benefits of water permits and trading,
and increasing stress on endangered species.
An analysis of the potential changes due to the regulation in SB 1477 finds that
without regulation, low water flow will significantly affect habitat for endangered
species (Gillig et al. 2004; Boadu et al. 2007). A recent analysis of proposed
legislative changes has compared expected water flows and economic benefits
with and without regulation and water markets. Results show that under regulation,
flows are higher without water markets but that regulated water markets are
necessary for habitat needs and that the economic loss due to regulation is reduced
when trading is permitted (Gillig et al. 2004; Boadu et al. 2007). Results also show
that unregulated groundwater use is expected to lead to insufficient water flow for
endangered species.
The experience in the Edwards Aquifer shows that legal battles can reduce the
benefits of water trading and regulation. In 2013, almost 20 years after the initial
legislation to regulate groundwater and create tradable permits was passed, the
expected benefits have still not been realized.
20.4 Lessons Learned from Groundwater Trade in Australia
and the US
There are a number of lessons that can be learned from this review of groundwater
trade in Australian and the US. They include:
1. Institutions matter: While there are physical limits on the operation of ground-
water markets, in Australia it appears that institutional barriers are as significant
an impediment to trade as hydrogeological factors. While groundwater trading is
permitted everywhere, only in a few states is there much market activity and
there are few trades relative to the number of entitlements held; this is largely
because trades are concentrated in particular areas. There is no consistency about
whether products are unbundled across states (NWC 2011). Variation in the
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rules established by Nebraska’s different NRDs affects the frequency and
feasibility of groundwater trading. The legal institutions involved in the man-
agement of the Edwards Aquifer in Texas have played a role in impeding the
development of a viable water market.
2. Science matters: Before groundwater markets can be established, it is critical to
understand and specify the boundaries of a groundwater management system.
Groundwater systems should be based on physical aquifers, have clearly defined
boundaries based on hydrogeological features. Interactions between surface
water and groundwater need to be understood and incorporated, as well as the
water quality of the system and the social and environmental externalities.
Entitlement and extraction limits must be as accurate as possible, as should
processes for changing long term entitlement and extraction limits, determining
allocation limits and restricting extractions during periods of shortage (GHD
et al. 2011).
3. A crisis can be an opportunity: Several examples of successful restructuring of
water rights and the development of water trading are due to necessity. For
example, a major impetus for the development and expansion of surface water
markets in both Australia and California was a multi-year drought in the late
1980s and early 1990s (Bjornlund and McKay 2000; Hanak 2003). In California,
where statewide groundwater legislation does not exist, courts have adjudicated
radical changes to groundwater rights, management and trading in examples of
severe stress, such as in the Tehachapi Basin and Mojace Basin north of Los
Angeles (Anderson and Snyder 1997). Interstate legal conflicts in Nebraska led
to legislative changes in the joint management of hydraulically connected
surface and groundwater.
4. Economics matters: As well as the need to put proper institutions in place, there
is a need for economics in groundwater management. There is a need to consider
how many users there are in a management area, the value to be gained from
trading groundwater, and the costs involved in establishing a market. A properly
established market will grow in trade over time, and optimal water prices
achieve efficient management by balancing benefits and costs across users and
across time (Hansen 2012). Rural water users in the western USA have typically
paid only for conveyancing and pumping cost of water, not its scarcity value.
Markets will allow the movement of water to high value users.
5. Society’s concerns do not always matter: Although policy needs to be
concerned with social externalities from water markets, it is not something
that should always be considered for designing efficient groundwater markets.
This is where other policy needs to be put in place to address those rural social
concerns; water markets should not be used as a second-best tool to address their
problems. There have been a myriad of concerns about equity, low income
impacts, rural community depopulation and the belief that water is a public
good that have led commentators to imply that water should not be commodified
(NWC 2012). However, setting water prices artificially low will result in ineffi-
cient pumping and consumption, and not allowing water markets to develop will
deny rural users a valuable adaptation and risk measure (Hansen 2012).
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Finally, the most important point that needs elaborating upon is that flexibility
matters. Flexibility in institutions, in policy, in scientific and social science research
is needed to continually deal with changes in the environment, the climate and
in rural conditions. There is an element of path dependence that has resulted in the
way institutions in each country are established and policy prescriptions for a variety
of environmental and water scarcity problems are made. In California, water mar-
keting and groundwater banking are essential tools for helping water users to
manage their scarce water resources more efficiently and sustainably. The continual
development of such tools augments the ability to cope with future droughts (Hanak
and Stryjewski 2012). In Australia, the decision to institute water markets, the
setting of the initial Cap on water use and the inability to recognise that this would
activate many unused water rights by such water owners selling their water, has led
to the situation in the 2000s where governments are buying back billions of dollars
of surface water entitlements in the MDB. By significantly increasing the demand
for water entitlements (and paying what is perceived to be higher prices for water),
this has also activated many farmers selling their surface water, and increasingly
turning to their groundwater entitlements to support their farm production. It is
predicted that this growth in groundwater use is unsustainable in the MDB. Such a
situation highlights the importance of history, and of how various policy decisions
play a part in creating further externalities down the line. It also highlights that
policy needs to be flexible to deal with unintended externalities that have resulted
from previous attempts to solve water issues.
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